Contemporary issues of foreign affairs suggest that Realism remains an essential paradigm for interpreting international relations, but should not be considered the sole paradigm. Competing theories of international relations have also emerged, particularly since World War I. Each of these theories have valid contributions to make in explaining actions and reactions in an anarchic global arena; and each have strengths and weaknesses depending on any number of influences, including culture, religion, and political and economic ideologies and situations. However, despite these emerging paradigms through which to understand global affairs, Realism remains a foundational view in understanding the international politics of power. So, what is Realism as a theory of international relations?
Essentially, Realism has its central tenet a belief that states are naturally competitive and conflictual, and that the international arena is a sphere without justice due to its anarchic structure (Korab-Karpowicz 2017). Within theories of Realism are two distinct but overlapping schools of thought: classical Realism and structural Realism, or neo-Realism.
Classical Realism has origins that are more than 2000 years old, with Thucydides “History of the Peloponnesian War”, and Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”. To both Thucydides and Sun Tzu moral reasoning was not considered useful to the state when faced with armed and dangerous neighbours (Goldstein 2017, 38). Thucydides, in discussion of relative power among the Greek states of 431-404 B.C., stated that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides 1972). Machiavelli’s “The Prince” also furthered this argument, explaining that good rulers must sometimes be cruel and cold in asserting their authority if they are to be effective in service to the interests of the state and if they wish to hold on to power. This is known as “Machiavelli’s doctrine of necessity” (Chiaruzzi 2015), and anything less is perceived as weakness.
After World War II, Hans Morgenthau argued that no nation had “God on its side” (Goldstein 2017, 38-39), meaning that there was no universal morality, and so states must – and will – be governed by objective laws, defined in terms of power and dominance, that sees human nature as inherently selfish and believes the most rational actions are in the pursuit of national interests only. These national interests concern themselves only with the power a state has relative to other states, to the dominance of material wealth and resources, and to issues of security. It contrasts with Liberalism (also known as Idealism), which is more peaceful and cooperative in its world view, and normative in that it sees the world as it ought to be, considering moral and psychological imperatives as drivers of human behaviour. Realism, on the other hand, claims to view the world as it really is: a dangerous place, where war always has a strong and unavoidable potential to erupt. Realism bases itself on empirical, historical evidence and assumes that what has gone before shall continue in the ways it always has. Realists tend to see Liberalists as nothing more than wishful thinkers.
In the latter part of the Cold War, Structural Realism was introduced to theories of international relations by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book, “Theory of International Politics”. This modernised the Realist view, making it a stronger starting point in understanding the international political structures, and how those structures can contribute to, or explain, why states behave aggressively. Written a decade before the end of the Cold War, Waltz argued that a balance of power in a bipolar world, one with two great powers, was the most desirable in an anarchic system because it would ensure peace through stability, and would likely persist through a strategy of deterrence, though tempered by the practice of detente. The problem with deterrence, however, is that it creates a security dilemma (Goldstein 2017, 44-45), whereby states engage in an arms race based on the assumption that a state that is increasing its military defences are an offensive threat to other states, which then escalates into two or more states increasing their military might through the purchase of mutually destructive weaponry, effectively playing a dangerous game of ‘Chicken’ with each other (Goldstein 2017, 66).
When the Cold War did finally end, most significantly with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, it did so without military conflict. The USSR, which was on the verge of collapse, due to being economically weakened by the practice of containment by the USA and its allies, simply decided to walk away without a fight. Realists could not foresee this, and could not explain it, exposing a weakness in the Realist perspective (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).
A further weakness in the theory was exposed by the events of September 11th, when the USA was attacked by non-state actors, Al Qaeda. As Realists, both Classical and Structural, see states as the primary actors in world events, they did not take seriously the threat of a small group of ideologically committed, non-state actors. It was ‘blind spot’ that cost many lives, shook the world, and caused the destruction of the World Trade Centre, and some destruction of The Pentagon, both symbolic targets of US hegemony.
Realism also fails to adequately explain the rise of globalisation and the liberalisation of world markets, which enhances cooperation over conflict. This is unevenly distributed at both individual and state level, however, and carries within it its own set of valid grievances – largely economic – into the international arena. Globalisation also encompasses social and psychological aspects that cannot be explained purely by power politics. In a globalised world, Structural Realist theory is perhaps best utilised to view the economic instincts of multinational corporations, as some corporations are now more economically powerful than some states. According to the World Bank, of the top 100 economies in the world, only 31 are countries, the remaining 69 are multinational corporations (Green 2016).
At the political level of international relations, globalisation must be viewed through a variety of theoretical lenses. Power relations, according to economic rather than military power, may still fit within the Realist tradition, though this perspective should not be utilised in isolation if globalisation and its effects are to be wholly understood.
In summary, Realist theories have evolved over time, and shall continue to evolve as global changes present new challenges to issues of terrorism and security, relations of state and of economic power, identity politics, and the rising inequalities between the global north and the global south. Scholars of international relations are re-examining the prevailing narratives of Classical Realists, revealing in their works (particularly of Morgenthau’s) an acknowledgement that “international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not for moral restraints and the work of international law” (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).
Despite the Realist’s view that the egoism and competitiveness inherent in human nature can only result in conflict; that statecraft and diplomacy operate on ‘game theory’, ‘zero-sum’ principles; and that the anarchy of the international arena is akin to a Hobbesian “state of nature”, Realist theory is often misinterpreted as being hawkish. This is a misconception, and Realism is far more committed to prudence and responsibility. It is the Realists who argued against war with Vietnam in 1965, and later with Iraq in 2002, albeit for no more moral imperative than neither country was a threat to US national interests (Goldstein 2017, 39). The Realist approach is to deal with each situation as it really is, rather than what Idealists would like it to be. And while it does not attribute moralities to the state, it does not abandon morality altogether (Chiaruzzi 2015, 36).
To conclude, the fact that Realism looks at international relations without sentiment or value judgements is where its strength lies. As a springboard to further understanding, the Realist approach is a valuable base – despite its perceived pessimism – and from this base, additional layers of theoretical understanding may be applied according to the specifics of each case, to gain the useful, critical insights into global affairs today.
References
Chiaruzzi, Michele. 2015. An Introduction to International Relations. Second Edition. Edited by Anthony Burke and Jim George Richard Devetak. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Goldstein, Jon C. W. Peveson & Joshua S. 2017. International Relations. Eleventh Edition. Boston, USA: Pearson.
Green, Duncan. 2016. Blog: The world’s top 100 economies: 31 countries; 69 corporations. September 20. Accessed August 21, 2017. https://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/world-s-top-100-economies-31-countries-69-corporations.
Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. 2017. “Political Realism in International Relations.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. May 24. Accessed August 20, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations.
Thucydides. 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War. Edited by Penguin. Translated by R. Warner.